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ABSTRACT
Among the challenges facing Greater China, the ombudsman is
rarely, if ever, considered one of them. Yet this relatively innocuous
institution can, under the right conditions, contribute much that is
beneficial to standards in public administration. This is the first Article to contrast the models of public sector ombudsman in Mainland
China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, drawing comparisons on
such features as institutional function, constitutional and legal status, relationship with the executive branch, process, substantive
powers, effectiveness and transparency. Even in a region as politically, constitutionally and economically associated as Greater
China, four diverse models of ombudsman coexist. They display
sharp differences from systemic function to institutional culture,
and as the region is now on a path of convergence, these are differences which may soon have to be reconciled. That reconciliation
would, as this Article shows, require a major reconceptualization
and reconfiguration of administrative supervision in at least three of
the jurisdictions under review.
* Associate Professor, City University of Hong Kong; Legal Adviser to the
Ombudsman of Hong Kong (this Article is not written in the latter capacity). I
would like to thank Jyh-An Lee and Yu Qi for helpful comments on a draft of this
Article, and Xu Qian for research assistance. I am also grateful to colleagues at the
Constitutional and Administrative Law Centre at Peking University and the Asian
Law Centre and Centre for Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of
Melbourne for constructive feedback on this research.

435

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

436

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Introduction............................................................................ 437
Outline of Public Sector Ombudsmen in Greater China .... 440
2.1. Mainland China ............................................................... 440
2.2. Hong Kong ....................................................................... 443
2.3. Macau .............................................................................. 444
2.4. Taiwan ............................................................................. 444
Institutional Function ............................................................ 446
Consolidated Versus Dispersed Institutional Models ........ 451
Constitutional and Legal Status ............................................ 455
Relationship with Executive Branch..................................... 456
Process and Substantive Powers........................................... 461
Effectiveness and Transparency ........................................... 475
Concluding Remarks ............................................................. 483
Table 1 ..................................................................................... 485

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/3

2017]

Four “Chinese” Models of Administrative Supervision

437

1. INTRODUCTION
Public sector ombudsmen can serve as an important mechanism
for complaints redress against public bodies and for promoting accountability and transparency within the public sector. They can
play a useful role in improving standards within public administration, from reducing corruption and malpractice, to improving efficiency and consistency in decision-making. However, there is no
universally agreed model of public sector ombudsman, from the
level of constitutional status and institutional design, to process and
practice. This is sharply illustrated by contrasting the models of
public sector ombudsman in the Greater China region, namely in
Mainland China,1 Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan2—a region in
which there has been significant political, constitutional and economic convergence, yet in which there has previously been no dedicated comparative assessment of these institutions.
Historical fragmentation of political power in the region, including the colonization of Hong Kong and Macau, and the Chinese
Communist Revolution, resulted in divergent legal and political traditions. The effect of the region’s diverse public law traditions on
their models of ombudsman, and a specific assessment of their institutional, conceptual and practical contrasts, has hitherto been little
explored in the literature. This is a pertinent area of focus given the
legal and political challenges faced by and between the region’s constituent jurisdictions, with particular challenges faced with the finite
provision for the autonomy of Hong Kong3 and Macau4 as Special
Administrative Regions, and the uncertain potential for reunification between the PRC and Taiwan. These future developments will
require assessments to be made on the future relationship between
the jurisdictions, and whether and to what extent an agenda of centralization, harmonization, pluralization or the status quo should be

1 “Mainland China” will be used to mean the Mainland of the People’s Republic of China in order to distinguish it from other jurisdictions in Greater China.
“PRC” is used for the People’s Republic of China as a whole, which includes the
Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions.
2 “Taiwan” and its official name, the “Republic of China” (“ROC”), are used
without implying a view on the constitutional status of Taiwan.
3 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region art. 5 [hereinafter Basic Law of Hong Kong].
4 Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region art. 5 [hereinafter
Basic Law of Macau] [https://perma.cc/VV4A-3QF4].
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pursued: the greater the challenge if either centralization or harmonization is pursued.
Furthermore, this study has broader appeal as a relevant comparison as “Asia has been underrepresented in comparative legal
and constitutional studies” and “there has been a tendency in comparative law, with implications for comparative constitutional law,
to treat Asian legal systems as homogenous.”5 Any presumption of
homogenous models of law and legal institutions will be tested and
challenged in relation to the ombudsman institutions in just one area
of Asia: the economic and political powerhouse of Greater China.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset the constitutional significance of ombudsman institutions. They typically share common
ideas of monitoring administrative activity for malpractice and deficiency, with aims including the promotion of transparency, accountability and public confidence in administration. They strive in
various ways to align administrative practice with particular ethical
conceptions of public administration. Importantly, it can be argued
that the ombudsman function plays a part in upholding constitutional values.6 For example, in the Basic Law of Hong Kong, residents have the right to social welfare in accordance with law.7
Whilst this is justiciable as a constitutional right, the work of the
Ombudsman can promote the right to social welfare by checking for
maladministration in the conduct of, for example, the Social Welfare
Department or the Housing Department in their provision of social
welfare—maladministration which might not necessarily be unlawful and would therefore not be susceptible to judicial review. Moreover, residents have a constitutional guarantee to equality before the
law,8 and this value is also promoted when the Ombudsman checks
for selective enforcement of rules by public bodies; again, something
that is not, in itself, unlawful. Similarly, existing common law values of constitutionalism and the rule of law continue to have a formal legal basis after the handover of Hong Kong from the United

5 Cheryl Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool, 4(3) NAT’L
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009).
6 See TREVOR BUCK, RICHARD KIRKHAM & BRIAN THOMPSON, THE OMBUDSMAN
ENTERPRISE AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 18–19 (2011) (stressing the importance of
ombudsmen, and the role they play in the separation of powers).
7 Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 36.
8 Id. art. 25.
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Kingdom to the PRC.9 Common law values such as certainty, predictability and non-retroactivity in decision-making can be promoted by an effective ombudsman institution reporting on administrative practice which contravenes these values. In fostering good
administrative practice, the values inherent in these constitutional
provisions are promoted by the ombudsman, perhaps in addition to
ideas of constitutionalism itself.10
There has been discussion on where the ombudsman fits in a tripartite conception of the constitution as a separation of legislative,
executive and judicial power.11 Taiwan had to some extent
preempted that question by erecting its ombudsman institution, the
Control Yuan, as part of a “five point power” conception of the constitution, though certain of its powers are more extensive than those
of ombudsmen in other systems. Bruce Ackerman has written on
the need to reject Montesquieu’s trinity of state power, citing independent electoral commissions and central banks as examples of institutions placing strain on the traditional tripartite conception of
the state bureaucracy.12 Similarly, ombudsmen play such a role in
the constitution, even if in a less direct way than in Taiwan. In short,
the significance of the ombudsman is not only in relation to administrative practice, but also to the constitutional implications of the
ways in which public administration is constrained and influenced
by ombudsman institutions.
This Article explores four diverse models of public sector ombudsman in the four constituent jurisdictions of Greater China. It
begins with an outline of the ombudsmen in the region, then ex-

Id. art. 8.
See, e.g., Albert H. Y. Chen, A Tale of Two Islands: Comparative Reflections on
Constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 647 (2007) (discussing constitutional experimentation in the last two decades in Asia, arguing for
Hong Kong’s Basic Law success and international recognition as well as Taiwan’s
peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy).
11 BUCK, KIRKHAM & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 15–19.
12 See
Bruce Ackerman, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128–33 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth eds.,
2010) (arguing for reconceptualization of the comparative law analysis framework
that would move beyond Montesquieu’s orthodox reflections on the separation of
powers); see also Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633 (2000) (arguing that there is no reason to assume the classical writers have exhausted all possible models and interpretations of the separation of powers doctrine; calling to seek new constitutional forms, transcending long-standing trinitarian principles).
9

10
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plores particular aspects of the institutions, their powers and processes. First, the institutional function of the ombudsman will be
considered, before examining whether and to what extent each jurisdiction adopts a more consolidated or more dispersed institutional model. The constitutional and legal status of each ombudsman will then be set out, followed by a discussion of their respective
relationships with the executive branch. Finally, the procedural and
substantive powers of each ombudsman will be explained, before an
evaluation of their effectiveness and transparency.
2. OUTLINE OF PUBLIC SECTOR OMBUDSMEN IN GREATER CHINA
A preliminary outline of each public sector ombudsman is necessary before discussing the specific characteristics of each institution. This is also useful for establishing an initial context within
which to set each institution, as a purely functional comparison may
overstate the comparability of the institutions under review.13 The
respective public sector ombudsmen of the four constituent jurisdictions of Greater China are: (i) the Ministry of Supervision (Mainland
China); (ii) the Ombudsman (Hong Kong); (iii) the Commission
Against Corruption (Macau); and (iv) the Control Yuan (Taiwan).
2.1. Mainland China
Formally, the Ministry of Supervision (监察部) (“MOS”) performs the state ombudsman function in Mainland China.14 Defined
13 See also Saunders, supra note 5, at 6; Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 PENN ST. INT’L. L. REV. 319, 325-326 (2009)
(noting that conducting a comparative analysis of constitutions at the functional
level is essential for developing a better understanding of other systems).
14 There are particular challenges in determining practice within the Ministry
of Supervision and its subsidiaries due to a lack of publicly available information,
as another author has acknowledged. See Thomas Stephan Eder, “China”, in ASIAN
OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 92 (Ursula Kriebaum &
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer eds., 2016) (stating that “no information could be obtained” in relation to MOS practice). The same author made this observation with
regard to practice within the State Bureau of Letters and Visits (“SBLV”), which also
performs ombudswork. See id., at 98. While the SBLV has been increasingly criticized in media and policy outlets for lack of effectiveness (and noting also that the
SBLV is not presented by Mainland China as the state ombudsman), the MOS has
received less scrutiny in this regard.
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by law to be in charge of supervision throughout the jurisdiction,15
this is a government institution under the State Council with a number of subsidiary supervisory authorities at the provincial and local
levels. The MOS was established in 1949 as the People’s Supervisory
Commission, reconstituted with its present title in 1954, abolished
in 1959 and re-established in 1987. It is a member of the Asian Ombudsman Association, but not the International Ombudsman Institute.16
Prior to the re-establishment of the MOS, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (“CCDI”) exercised disciplinary jurisdiction over members of the Communist Party of China (the
“Party”) holding public office. The MOS was given jurisdiction over
cases involving public officeholders, whether or not they were members of the Party. As most public officeholders were (and are) Party
members, both organizations were often involved in the investigation process. The MOS was operationally merged with the CCDI in
1993, though the two retain separate organizational identities. The
MOS and the CCDI have a shared website.17 The MOS, which has
around 800 employees,18 has been described as a “nominal component” of the State Council, which is directly under the leadership of
the CCDI and “may be regarded as part of it.”19 This would suggest
that the Party is the principal agency of supervision, rather than the
state as such. However, Andrew Wedeman has argued that annual
reports show that discipline inspection committees under the CCDI
largely supervise individuals, whilst the MOS largely supervises institutions.20 This potentially differentiates the work of the MOS and
15 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Supervision
(adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National
People’s Congress, May 9, 1997; amended by Decision of the Standing Committee
of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Revising the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, June 25, 2010) art. 7 [hereafter Law
on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=134401 [https://perma.cc/B2JJ-ERJH].
16 The Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese institutions do not share membership
of the same organizations, perhaps for political reasons.
17 CCDI & MOS, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/WWA4-FTPS]
(LAST VISITED Nov. 28, 2017) (in Chinese).
18 Eder, supra note 14, at 88.
19 Guo Yong, The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection
Commission in the Reform Era, 12 THE CHINA REV. 1, 2 (2012).
20 Andrew Wedeman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 THE CHINA
Q. 895, 900–01 (2004) (arguing that corruption intensified after the advent of reforms).
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the CCDI to the extent that there may remain distinctiveness between their respective jurisdictions and scope of work. In that vein,
it has elsewhere been stated that the MOS is the administrative
equivalent of the CCDI,21 but that the CCDI may be regarded as the
more powerful of the two agencies.22
Nevertheless, whilst the Mainland presents the MOS to the region as its public sector ombudsman—the MOS, rather than the
CCDI, being a member of the Asian Ombudsman Association—it
will be seen that in practical terms the MOS is subordinate to the
Party, which retains the upper hand in matters of administrative supervision. However, it is still the MOS that is designated as Mainland China’s public sector ombudsman.
It is important to note that Mainland-wide reforms are on the
horizon with regard to the mechanism for administrative supervision, with a Pilot Program being run in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi
Province and Zhejiang Province.23 Nevertheless, this Article describes the existing system for four main reasons. First, nationwide

21 Yasheng Huang, Administrative Monitoring in China, 143 THE CHINA Q. 828,
836 (1995).
22 Id., at 837.
23 See Decision Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province and Zhejiang Province (adopted at the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National
People’s Congress on Dec. 25, 2016; effective Dec. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Pilot Program
Decision
(Mainland
China)],
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=287285&lib=law [https://perma.cc/EFZ3-G5RV]. It is provided
that supervision committees shall also be established at county, city, and municipal
level within those regions. Introduced in the context of anti-corruption reforms,
one of the main objectives appears to be centralization of the administrative supervision function. This is seen in the investment of powers in the new supervision
committees to supervise “all civil servants,” which would include members and
non-members of the Party. At present, the CCDI supervises Party members,
whereas the MOS has jurisdiction over public officeholders whether or not they are
Party members. Whilst this is a significant legal change, it is unclear to what extent
it represents a significant practical change, as the CCDI and MOS already work
closely. Centralization is also seen in the absorption by the supervision committees
of the relevant functions of the MOS subsidiaries and the NCPB subsidiaries in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang. The relevant existing legal provisions on administrative
supervision “shall be temporarily adjusted or ceased” in Beijing, Shanxi, and
Zhejiang to enable the new supervision committees to be established. It appears,
nevertheless, that CCDI, MOS, SPP and NCPB subsidiaries will continue to exist
with their own functions. See e.g., The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s New Supervision System to Cover All Public Authorities
(Nov.
9,
2016),
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1518891/1518891.htm [https://perma.cc/WK4K-WMGP] (citing the
objective of such reforms as making the existing supervision system more efficient,
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reform has not yet been formally announced. Second, a sufficient
level of detail on the Pilot Program is not yet available. Third, to the
extent that the Pilot Program may serve as a blueprint for nationwide reform, there may be modifications applied when nationwide
reforms are introduced. Finally, though the Pilot Program implements structural changes, it does not at this stage appear to be significantly different from the current system in terms of substance,
powers and context.
2.2. Hong Kong
The Ombudsman (申訴專員公署) of Hong Kong was first established in 1989 as the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints,
becoming known as the Ombudsman from 1996, and essentially
constructed on the New Zealand and UK models of the ombudsman. It absorbed part of the work of the Redress System of the Office of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils
(“OMELCO”), previously known as the Office of the Unofficial
Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (“UMELCO”).24
Whilst the Ombudsman is an individual, she is supported by an office of around 120 regular staff (including a Deputy Ombudsman
and two Assistant Ombudsmen) and a panel of advisers, and is now
established as a corporation sole. Her powers are statutory in nature, derived from the Ombudsman Ordinance (cap. 397). As will
be explained, her jurisdiction is over instances of maladministration
committed by specified public bodies in their exercise of administrative functions. She is not directly engaged in performing anticorruption work. The Ombudsman is a member of both the Asian

and pointing out that the aim for deepened reform of the current supervision system is to build a national anti-graft organ under the leadership of the Party). It also
suggests that the Pilot Program is intended to be a forerunner to nationwide reform.
It would be unlikely that the Pilot Program would be declared a failure or having
failed to have achieved its objectives in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang, so the Pilot
Program is likely intended to resolve practical issues in the implementation of the
reforms with the intention of pressing ahead with nationwide reform. There will,
of course, be further developments to come.
24 The Legislative Council Redress System now embodies the Redress System
previously operated by UMELCO and OMELCO. Whilst the Legislative Council
Redress System appears still to be capable of dealing with complaints about maladministration, the Ombudsman is the principal institution with jurisdiction over
maladministration.
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Ombudsman Association and the International Ombudsman Institute.
2.3. Macau
The Commission Against Corruption (澳门廉政公署, Comissariado contra a Corrupção) (“CCAC”) performs the public sector ombudsman function in Macau. It was preceded by the High Commission Against Corruption and Administrative Illegality set up in
1992, with reasonable continuity in terms of its structure and staffing
arrangements. The CCAC was established under Article 59 of the
Basic Law of Macau, effective on the establishment of the Macau
Special Administrative Region on 20 December 1999 on the transfer
of sovereignty from Portugal to the PRC. It combines the dual function of anti-corruption work and ombudswork. The CCAC is
headed by the Commissioner Against Corruption, who holds the
status of a public authority.25 He may nominate two deputy commissioners to be appointed and dismissed by the Chief Executive,26
and appoint support staff and advisers.27 The CCAC is a member of
both the Asian Ombudsman Association and the International Ombudsman Institute.
2.4. Taiwan
The ombudsman function in Taiwan is performed by the Control
Yuan (監察院).28 It is one of five branches of the state, three of which
(the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan)
broadly align with their western counterparts, and two of which (the

25 Law No 10/2000, Organic Law of the Commission Against Corruption (as
amended by Law No 4/2012) art. 19 [hereinafter Organic Law of CCAC (Macau)],
http://images.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2000/33/lei-10-2000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AAJ6-NXB8].
26 Id. art. 24, § 1.
27 Id. arts. 29–30.
28 See Yeong-kuang Ger, Institutional Design and Development in the ROC (Taiwan): A Critical Review of the Thoughts of Sun Yat-sen and the Global Development of the
Ombudsman System, 4 MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1 (2011) (discussing the
origins of the Control Yuan and its functions).
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Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan) have their origins in traditional concepts of Chinese government and constitutional theory.29 Created in 1931, and then officially established under the ROC
Constitution in 1948, it has been traced to ancient supervisory functions performed in China.30 The Control Yuan has its constitutional
foundation in Article 90 and Additional Article 7 of the ROC Constitution, where it is designated as the highest supervisory body of
the state with the powers of impeachment, censure and audit.31
The role played by the Control Yuan has substantially changed
over time.32 For example, its members used to be elected by provincial and municipal councils, and in that context the Judicial Yuan
issued a constitutional interpretation whereby the Control Yuan,
along with the—now suspended—National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, “from the perspective of the nature of their statuses
and functions in the Constitution, should be considered as equivalent to the parliaments of democratic nations.”33 However, when
members came to be nominated by the President of the ROC and
confirmed by the National Assembly, the Control Yuan was no
29 See Herbert Han-Pao Ma, The Chinese Control Yuan: An Independent Supervisory Organ of the State, 4 WASH. U.L.Q. 401, 401–03 (1963) (explaining the historical
origins of the Control Yuan).
30 See Ger, supra note 28, at 4–14 (detailing historical, political traditions in
China with emphasis on ancient supervisory functions).
31 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) art. 7, § 1 (1947),
https://www.ey.gov.tw/pda_en/Upload/WebArchive/4697/Constitution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YBX-PBG7]. Impeachment and censure powers are exercised
under the Control Act of the Republic of China (promulgated by Presidential decree, July 17, 1948, amended 1949-1992) [hereinafter Control Act (Taiwan)],
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3158&mp=21&CtNode=1734&returnctNode=1734&returnxItem=3139 [https://perma.cc/YW42-A8GX], whereas audit
powers are exercised under the Audit Act (promulgated by Presidential decree,
Nov. 11, 1998). The audit function is carried out by the Ministry of Audit (National
Audit Office), which is a subordinate part of the Control Yuan. Previously there
was an Audit Yuan, established in 1928, but this was brought under the Control
Yuan in 1931. Today asset declarations by public officials and political donations
are required to be reported to the Control Yuan. See Ger, supra note 28, at 38–39
(describing the Political Donations Act and the power it provides to the Control
Yuan to control and supervise political candidates).
32 See Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Cheng Chang, Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 822 (2011) (noting that the
Control Yuan in 2011 played a “very different role” than in 1948).
33 JUDICIAL
YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 76 (1957), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=76
[https://perma.cc/CJ8D-T3JZ]; see also Ma, supra note 29, at 425 (stating the Control
Yuan’s functions and powers were “similar to those important powers exercised by
the parliaments of democratic nations”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

446

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:2

longer a central representative authority, and that interpretation
was deemed no longer applicable.34 The Control Yuan is not considered a quasi-judicial organization, but rather an ombudsman.35
Whereas an ombudsman is often a defined person acting with the
corporate support of an office or bureaucracy, the Control Yuan is a
collegiate entity comprising twenty-nine members as mandated by
the ROC Constitution.36 This includes a president and a vice president. The Control Yuan is a member of the International Ombudsman Institute, but not the Asian Ombudsman Association.37
3. INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION
The institutions under review perform distinguishable functions, suggesting variance in the conception of the state ombudsman
function, even in an area as politically, economically and (particularly in relation to Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau) constitutionally associated as Greater China.
The Law on Administrative Supervision is the main piece of legislation regulating the supervisory work of the MOS. It was enacted
to “guarantee the smooth implementation of government decrees,
maintain administrative discipline, facilitate the building of an honest and clean government, improve administration and raise administrative efficiency.”38 The MOS has jurisdiction over departments
under the State Council, public servants working in such departments, other persons appointed by the State Council and the departments under it, and the governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central People’s
Government and the leading members of such governments.39 It

34 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 325
(1993), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=325
[https://perma.cc/R6JH-53JQ].
35 See Ger, supra note 28, at 15–16 (explaining why it is improper to refer to the
Control Yuan as a quasi-judicial body).
36 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) art. 7, § 2.
37 See supra note 16.
38 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 1.
39 Id. art. 15.
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also has the power to handle matters of supervision within the jurisdiction of subsidiary supervisory organs.40 The MOS and its subsidiaries have jurisdiction over complaints about the police, together
with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), its subsidiaries
and internal police review agencies.41 The standard complaints
mechanism against the police is through the Complaint Redress Department of the Ministry of Public Security.
The work of the MOS ranges from fighting corruption to promoting efficiency in public administration. It shall “organize, coordinate, examine, and guide the work related to promoting political
affairs transparency and rectification of malpractice that damage[s]
the interest of the general public.”42 Its jurisdiction is over political,
economic and administrative discipline. Political offences include
insubordination, spreading lies and falsehoods, and revealing state
or Party secrets. Economic offences include bribery, fraud and wasting public resources. Finally, administrative offences include bureaucratism, error in policy-making, dereliction of duty, negligence,
abdication of authority, unsatisfactory management, indiscriminate
use of authority for private gain, use of public funds for banquets,
entertainment, gifts and holidays, and “degeneracy.”43
The focus of the Ombudsman of Hong Kong’s work is maladministration, though this is defined only in general terms:
inefficient, bad or improper administration and, without
derogation from the generality of the foregoing, includes—
(a) unreasonable conduct, including delay, discourtesy and
lack of consideration for a person affected by any action;
(b) abuse of any power (including any discretionary power)
or authority including any action which—
(i) is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly
discriminatory or which is in accordance with a prac-

Id. art. 17.
See People’s Police Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the
12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress
on Feb. 28, 1995; revised Oct. 26, 2012), arts. 42, 46 [hereinafter Police Law (Mainland
China)],
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=13221&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/8FU9-XQP5].
42 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 18.
43 Wedeman, supra note 20, at 901–02.
40
41
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tice which is or may be unreasonable, unjust,oppressive or improperly discriminatory; or
(ii) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or
fact; or
(c) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory procedures.44
This is clearly not an exhaustive definition, and the Ombudsman
takes maladministration to include—but not be limited to—abuse of
power, delay, inaction, disparity in treatment, unfairness, error,
wrong advice or decision, failure to follow procedures, faulty procedures, ineffective control, lack of response or reply to complainant
or enquirer, negligence, omissions, selective enforcement, and poor
staff attitude.45 Notably, maladministration includes lawful and unlawful conduct and the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over both.
Since unlawful conduct is susceptible to judicial review in the
courts, there is potential for overlap between the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the courts.
The Ombudsman can investigate the administrative functions of
an array of public bodies which are included in Schedule 1 of the
Ombudsman Ordinance. These range from government departments and the Equal Opportunities Commission to the public
broadcaster. It should be noted that the Ombudsman has the power
to investigate the administrative functions of such bodies, which
would appear to exclude judicial functions. Excluded from the ordinary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman are the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”),46 Hong Kong Police Force,
Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force, and Secretariat of the Public Service Commission. These bodies are subject to the scrutiny of the
Ombudsman only in relation to the Code on Access to Information,
a non-binding set of guidelines on freedom of information.47
There are various restrictions on the Ombudsman’s power to investigate allegations of maladministration, including a prohibition
44 Ombudsman Ordinance, Cap. 397, § 2(1) (Hong Kong) (1996) [hereinafter
Ombudsman
Ordinance
(Hong
Kong)],
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap397?p0=1&p1=1 [https://perma.cc/5ZWP-UYUH].
45 See OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE OMBUDSMAN’S ROLE AND JURISDICTION:
WHAT IS MALADMINISTRATION (2013),
http://www.ombudsman.hk/enus/about_this_office/role_and_jurisdiction.html [https://perma.cc/TG6A-PF67].
46 See generally infra Sections 4, 5, and 6.
47 Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), § 7(1)(b).
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on the investigation of: matters affecting security, defense or international relations; the commencement or conduct of court or tribunal proceedings; contractual and commercial transactions (excluding tendering procedures); personnel matters; and government land
decisions.48
The CCAC of Macau is tasked with examining both legality and
“administrative correctness.”49 Its main operational divisions are
the Cabinet of the Commissioner, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and
the Ombudsman Bureau. The Ombudsman Bureau, which is comprised of an investigation arm and a research arm, is responsible for:
receiving complaints and investigating allegations of administrative
wrongdoing; protecting individual rights, freedoms, safeguards,
and legitimate interests; contributing to fairness, transparency, justice and efficiency in public administration; making recommendations to correct unlawful and unfair acts; and recommending improvements to administrative procedures and systems.50
The Anti-Corruption Bureau is principally focused on criminal
activity, though cases involving both criminal and administrative
offenses are coordinated with the Ombudsman Bureau.51 In addition to jurisdiction over public bodies, the CCAC’s ombudsman
oversight extends to companies which are under full or majority
public ownership.52 Its specific anti-bribery oversight, however, extends to the private sector.53 There is provision for limited ombudsman oversight of “relationships between private individuals involving a special relation of dominance, within the scope of the
protection of rights, freedoms and safeguards.”54 Notably, the
CCAC performs both an ombudsman and an anti-corruption func-

Id. § 8 and sched. 2.
Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 4(5).
50 Id. art. 3(1)(5); Admin. Reg. No. 3/2013, Amend. to Admin. Reg. No. 3/2009:
Organization and Operation of the Commission Against Corruption (promulgated
by Macau Special Admin. Region, Mar. 18, 2013), art. 23 [hereinafter Admin. Reg.
No. 3/2013 (Macau)], http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2013/12/regadm03_cn.asp
[https://perma.cc/EK64-NAS7].
51 Admin. Reg. No. 3/2013 (Macau) arts. 17(3), 22(3).
52 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2-A(2).
53 Id. arts. 2-A, 3(1)(1), 3(1)(3), 4(1); Law No. 19/2009, Prevention and Suppression of Bribery in the Private Sector (enacted by the Legis. Assembly), art. 7(1) (Macau),
http://www.ccac.org.mo/PrivSec/en/law/01.htm
[https://perma.cc/7MWL-Q4U4].
54 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2-A(2).
48
49
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tion, whereas the Ombudsman of Hong Kong performs only the former.
The scope of the Taiwanese Control Yuan’s jurisdiction is extensive. It has the power to investigate cases involving other Yuans,
and its power of impeachment also extends over personnel of the
Control Yuan.55 The Control Yuan even has the power of impeachment over judges,56 which might be taboo in other systems in the
name of judicial independence. It does not, however, have the
power of impeachment over the President, Vice President, and legislators. The President and Vice President are impeached on the initiative of the Legislative Yuan and adjudicated upon by the Grand
Justices of the Judicial Yuan,57 whereas legislators are accountable
through democratic channels. Nevertheless, it seems that the Control Yuan may apply a lower intensity of review when investigating
an elected official for impeachment, to avoid trespassing on the
power of electors to recall that official from office through democratic mechanisms.58
The Control Yuan was required to establish a Department of Supervisory Operations, Department of Supervisory Investigation, Department of Asset Declaration by Public Functionaries, Secretariat,
General Planning Office and Information Management Office,59 in
addition to the National Audit Office.60 It has a Special Committee
on Anti-Corruption, though whilst this would primarily operate in
the context of impeachment, censure and proposal of corrective
measures; criminal investigation and prosecution of corruption is
the responsibility of the Agency Against Corruption, which is part
of the Ministry of Justice.
The Control Yuan has a Human Rights Protection Committee
and can investigate alleged human rights violations. However, it

Id. art. 7(4).
See, e.g., Ger, supra note 28, at 22–23 (providing statistics and examples of
judges who were impeached by the Control Yuan).
57 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) arts. 2(9)–(10). The
Control Yuan formerly had the power to impeach the President and Vice President
under Article 100 of the ROC Constitution.
58 See Ger, supra note 28, at 24–26. A relatively recent example of an elected
official being impeached is William Lai, Mayor of Tainan. Tsai Wen-Chu, Control
Yuan to Impeach Tainan Mayor Lai, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/08/05/2003624642
[https://perma.cc/C9SK-27ET].
59 Organic Law of the Control Yuan (amended May 19, 2010) art. 10.
60 Id. art. 4.
55
56
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has been proposed that a national human rights commission be established as it has been doubted whether the Control Yuan has the
necessary capacity and focus to monitor human rights.61 Nevertheless, in 2015, the most recent year for which figures are available,
over 82% of all complaints handled by the Control Yuan raised human rights issues.62
The institutional functions of the public sector ombudsmen
therefore exhibit different areas of emphasis. In Mainland China,
the focus of the MOS is on administrative discipline and, perhaps
increasingly, anti-corruption. The work of the Ombudsman of
Hong Kong is concerned with addressing maladministration but not
corruption,63 whilst Macau’s CCAC is engaged in tackling both corruption and administrative malpractice. The Control Yuan of Taiwan, meanwhile, is primarily an institution of impeachment, censure, audit, and—to some extent—human rights protection. While
there are areas of overlap between the work of these institutions,
there are clear differences in emphasis.
4. CONSOLIDATED VERSUS DISPERSED INSTITUTIONAL MODELS
The Greater Chinese jurisdictions exhibit different approaches to
whether ombudsman functions are consolidated in one or more
closely associated institutions or distributed among a more dispersed array of bodies.
It might have been expected that Mainland China would display
strong characteristics of a consolidated model of public sector ombudsman, given its tendency to centralized power and decisionmaking. However, it adopts a blend of consolidated and dispersed
approaches. Ombudswork is undertaken by a range of institutions,
with the MOS being one of four anti-corruption agencies in Mainland China, the others being the CCDI, the SPP (in which there is an
Anti-Corruption Bureau), and the National Corruption Prevention

61 See Yu-jie Chen, Human Rights in China-Taiwan Relations: How Taiwan Can
Engage China, 45 H.K.L.J. 565, 588 (2015) (discussing how “some experts have questioned whether the Control Yuan has the capacity and the focus that an institution
dedicated to human rights matters should have”).
62
TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ANNUAL REPORT OF
CONTROL
YUAN,
27
(2015),
http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?fileTHE
Name=671513451471.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L9K-DERT].
63 See infra Sections 4 and 6.
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Bureau (“NCPB”).64 The Xinhua News Agency plays a role in gathering information related to corruption.65 The system of complaint
letters and visits affords a further opportunity for persons to express
grievances with public officers and the conduct of public administration.66 Complaints about judicial cases can be made to the Complaint Redress Department of the Supreme People’s Court, whilst
jurisdiction over police complaints is shared between the MOS, the
SPP and its subsidiaries, internal police review agencies and the
Complaint Redress Department of the Ministry of Public Security.
This points to a dispersed institutional model in Mainland China,
with a range of institutions involved in the performance of ombudswork.
However, there are also signs of consolidation in the current system. There is overlap in key personnel of the MOS, CCDI and
NCPB.67 The current practice is for the Minister of Supervision to
simultaneously hold the position of Deputy Secretary of the CCDI
and the position of Director of the NCPB.68 Importantly, as the Minister of Supervision is the Deputy Secretary of the CCDI, he is in that

64 See generally Jon S.T. Quah, Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China:
An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March
2015), MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 4 (2015) (“After becoming the General
Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at
the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign to eliminate the ‘tigers and flies’ who had become rich through bribery and
patronage.”).
65 See John L. Thornton, Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China,
87 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 7 (2008) (providing that one of the functions of the Xinhua News
Agency “is to gather information on corruption nationwide and produce internal
reports for the central leadership”).
66 See Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (promulgated by Decree No.
431 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 5, 2005, effective May
1, 2005) [hereinafter Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China)],
http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/news050428-3.htm [https://perma.cc/2AUHAVKS]; see also infra Section 8.
67 See 3 THE CHINA LEGAL DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK: ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 13, n.18 (Li Lin ed., 2009) (describing overlap of key personnel).
68 The recent career experience of the current Minister of Supervision, Yang
Xiaodu, appears largely to have been in the CCDI and other Party roles, perhaps
indicating the tenor of his work and experience. This is in contrast to that of the
Ombudsman of Hong Kong, Connie Lau Yin Hing, who previously served as
Chairman of the UN Consumer Protection Rights Advisory Group and as the Chief
Executive Officer of the Consumer Council in Hong Kong, her recent background
generally being in public service. The Commissioner Against Corruption in Macau,
Cheong Weng Chon, was previously Director of the Legal Affairs Bureau for 14
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capacity subordinate to the Secretary of the CCDI, who is typically
a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party. This
indicates the relationship between the state and Party machinery,
including their actual or perceived order of precedence. Whilst the
MOS and its subsidiaries are deemed to be subject to no interference
from administrative departments, public organizations or individuals,69 the degree of control, de facto or otherwise, the Party is capable
of exerting over the MOS and its subsidiaries, means that the MOS
must in practice be strongly influenced by the Party, whether or not
this constitutes “interference.” The Mainland Chinese picture is
therefore a mixed approach of consolidated and dispersed models—
a range of actors and institutions participating in the execution of
ombudsman functions, but ultimately unified under the control of
the Party. Further consolidation may be in store with the Pilot Program in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province, combining the functions of MOS subsidiaries and NCPB subsidiaries in the new supervision committees in those regions,70
stated to “effectively strengthen the leadership of the Party.”71
The two Special Administrative Regions display a strong degree
of consolidation. The ombudsman function in Hong Kong is vested
primarily in the Ombudsman, with anti-corruption functions vested
in the ICAC, a separate institution. As ombudswork can be functionally distinguished from anti-corruption work, this represents a
strong degree of consolidated power in the two institutions. The
work of the Ombudsman (and ICAC) is complemented by parallel
redress systems, such as the Legislative Council Redress System,72
and the Complaints Against Police Office with oversight by the Independent Police Complaints Council. However, primary oversight
for maladministration in the public sector is vested in the Ombudsman.
In Macau, there is a greater degree of consolidation. Whilst there
are parallel complaint redress systems in operation, including the

years. The President of the Control Yuan of Taiwan, Chang Po-ya, has a background primarily in public service, whilst the Vice President of the Control Yuan,
Sun Ta-chuan, has a background in academia and public service.
69 Law on Admin. Supervision (Mainland China) art. 3.
70 See Pilot Program Decision (Mainland China), supra note 23.
71 Id.
72 Formerly known as the Redress System of UMELCO and OMELCO. See supra Section 2.2.
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Public Information Centre and the Macau Security Forces Disciplinary Committee,73 the CCAC is vested with both ombudsman and
anti-corruption functions, unlike its Hong Kong counterpart where
these have been separated into different institutions. In addition,
whereas the Ombudsman of Hong Kong is a statutory creation, the
CCAC enjoys a constitutional foothold and therefore has greater formal and structural entrenchment than the Ombudsman of Hong
Kong.74
Institutional consolidation is also high in Taiwan, all the more so
considering the Control Yuan has a comparatively strong degree of
institutional independence and constitutional equality with other
branches of the state.75 The Control Yuan is not the sole performer
of ombudsman and anti-corruption functions in Taiwan. When
members have made a determination of impeachment, the case is
turned over to a competent disciplinary organ for action, typically a
commission of the Judicial Yuan.76 Importantly, however, the Control Yuan is vested with the power of impeachment—usually found
in legislatures—which, apart from formal consequences for the impeached official, also carries significant reputational indictment. It
therefore represents the investment of considerable constitutional
and political authority in an ombudsman institution. Furthermore,
the Control Yuan is the only institution under review that is also
vested with an active role in the protection of human rights.
There is a broad pattern of consolidated power across the
Greater Chinese jurisdictions, but this takes different forms. In Taiwan, consolidation occurs through the medium of a hierarchically
equal constitutional footing for the Control Yuan, while in Macau it
is seen through the unification of the ombudsman and anti-corruption functions in the CCAC, which is given a specific constitutional
foothold. In Hong Kong, the ombudsman and anti-corruption functions are separated, and then vested in two dedicated institutions,
namely the Ombudsman and the ICAC, respectively. Meanwhile,
Mainland China opts for an ostensibly dispersed model, with a
range of different actors and institutions participating in ombudswork and anti-corruption work, but operating within a system of de
73 Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Commission Against Corruption,
Macau, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau)].
74 See infra Sections 5 and 6.
75 Id.
76 For a further discussion on process and substantive powers of the Control
Yuan, see infra Section 7.
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facto consolidation under the overarching authority of the Party.
Whereas consolidation is formally institutionalized through constitutional or legislative instruments in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, it is discerned in Mainland China through the underlying political authority of the ruling party.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STATUS
The ombudsman institutions enjoy different constitutional and
legal statuses. The most firmly established is the Control Yuan of
Taiwan, which is entrenched by Additional Article 7 of the ROC
Constitution. While this does not spell complete autonomy from the
other branches,77 its erection as a formally equal institutional pillar
of the state gives it a solid constitutional and legal foundation. The
only other institution to enjoy an express constitutional foothold is
the CCAC of Macau, for which there is specific provision in the Basic
Law of Macau.78 This, again, does not mean that it functions with
complete autonomy from other state institutions,79 but it does provide for a formal constitutional guarantee of independence and
means that it could not be abolished by ordinary legislation of the
Macanese legislature.
By contrast, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong enjoys no such constitutional entrenchment, as it is founded on ordinary legislation.
Whilst there is no obvious reason why there should be political appetite to do so, this means that the Ombudsman can be modified or
abolished by ordinary legislation of the Legislative Council in Hong
Kong. The ICAC is constitutionally entrenched in the Basic Law of
Hong Kong,80 just as is the CCAC of Macau; however, the ICAC is
tasked solely with an anti-corruption function, rather than the performance of broader ombudswork. It is nevertheless worth acknowledging that there are questions as to whether entrenchment
in the Basic Law of either Hong Kong or Macau is “real” constitutional entrenchment, given the contested nature of the constitutional
status of the Basic Law of each Special Administrative Region.
77 For a further discussion on the Control Yuan’s relationship with the executive branch, see infra Section 6.
78 Basic Law of Macau art. 59.
79 For a further discussion on the CCAC’s relationship with the executive
branch, see infra Section 6.
80 Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 57.
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No specific constitutional provision is made in Mainland China
for the MOS. Accordingly, the MOS can be reorganized, redefined,
or abolished by the NPC. The Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong
ombudsman institutions therefore enjoy no constitutional entrenchment, unlike their Macanese and Taiwanese counterparts.
6. RELATIONSHIP WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH
One of the structural features that can assist the effectiveness of
an ombudsman and public confidence that the ombudsman is an independent monitor of public administration, is the extent to which
it is appropriately distanced from the executive.81 There are essentially three ways in which the ombudsman can be related to the executive: (i) as part of the executive, (ii) reliant on, but not part of, the
executive, and (iii) neither reliant on, nor part of, the executive.
Of the four jurisdictions under review, only in Mainland China
is the ombudsman function fulfilled by a government ministry with
little or no attempt made to distance the performance of that function from the executive. This system is not exclusive to Mainland
China—in Japan, for example, the state ombudsman function is also
performed by a branch of the executive, namely the Administrative
Evaluation Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Membership of the executive does not automatically
erode the basis on which the ombudsman acts nor its effectiveness
in monitoring public administration. What matters are the implications of the ombudsman being part of the executive in the context of
a specific system.
In the context of Mainland China, a particular structural concern
is the sharing or blurring of the ombudsman function between the
MOS and the CCDI. It is unclear whether the supervisory function
is performed by a state institution proper or by the Party. As noted,
the practice is for the Minister of Supervision to also serve as Deputy
Secretary of the CCDI and as Director of the NCPB. The overlap of
state and Party function and personnel is unsurprising considering
the effective monopoly of the Party over state machinery, and the
phenomenon of parallel state and Party competence is seen else-

81

8.

For a further discussion on effectiveness and transparency, see infra Section
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where such as in the Central Military Commission and in local government.82 It could even be argued that, given the political realities
of Mainland China, involvement of the Party machinery in administrative supervision might strengthen the ombudsman function.
However, the effective merger of the MOS and CCDI subsidiaries has been asymmetric across different local areas.83 In addition,
structurally, the investment of the ombudsman function in a government ministry, the functions of which are not clearly distinguishable from those of a parallel Party body, does not inspire confidence
that monitoring would be conducted independently of executive
and political constraints. It may well be designed in that way precisely to avoid the possibility of independent monitoring. In reality,
the CCDI may be the dominant supervisor, as has been suggested
by other commentators,84 in which case the foundation of the MOS
as the state ombudsman institution is eroded—yet the MOS is still
designated by Mainland China as the national ombudsman. There
also seems to be a lack of clarity between the investigation channels
of each body, which muddies the waters between administrative
and political supervision.85
The Ombudsman of Hong Kong and the CCAC of Macau fall
into the second category: they are reliant on, but not (formally) part
of, the executive. The Ombudsman is generally regarded as distinct
from the legislature, executive, and judiciary; though, if one had to
functionally align the institution with one of the branches of state, it
would be the executive. While she is appointed and removed by the
Chief Executive for a renewable period of five years,86 it is provided
82 See, e.g., Susan V. Lawrence, China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts,
CONG. R. SERV. (Nov. 12, 2013) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4857-KVZC] (report intended to assist in identifying “where
political institutions and individuals fit within the broader Chinese political system
and to identify which Chinese officials are responsible for specific portfolios”); see
also WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS
121–24, 173–77 (2014) (outlining the organization of the Chinese Communist Party).
83 See Randall Peerenboom, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 417
(2002) (noting that some cities merged both personnel and workload, while others
attempted to maintain some degree of separation). This may be less of an issue if
the Pilot Program resolves structural inconsistencies.
84 See supra Section 2.1.
85 See Larry C. Backer & Keren Wang, The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order, 23(2) PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 251, 281–84, 336–37 (2014) (pointing out
that, in practice, the MOS and the CCDI are administered essentially by the same
personnel).
86 Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), §§ 3(3), (3A).
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that the Ombudsman is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of
the Government, or as enjoying any status, immunity, or privilege
of the Government.87 In addition, the Ombudsman is prohibited
from holding any other office of profit, or from engaging in any
other occupation for reward, without the specific approval of the
Chief Executive.88 She may resign from office at any time, or can be
removed by the Chief Executive with the approval by resolution of
the Legislative Council in the event of an inability to discharge the
functions of her office or misbehavior.89
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman is financially reliant on the executive, and must submit an annual report to the Chief Executive for
tabling in the Legislative Council.90 This includes a statement of accounts and an auditor’s report, which is made freely available on the
internet for public scrutiny. In practice, the Ombudsman is regarded as operating quite independently of the executive, and the
anecdotal evidence is that she is not subject to political pressure.
However, the institution remains reliant on the executive thus maintaining a degree of structural proximity.
The position is similar in Macau, where the Commissioner
Against Corruption is appointed by the Central People’s Government on the nomination of the Chief Executive,91 and is removed in
the same way.92 Unlike for the Ombudsman of Hong Kong, there is
no provision that the Commissioner must be unable to fulfil his duties or have misbehaved prior to being removed from post. However, he is suspended of his functions if he is served with a decision
of indictment or a decision specifying a date for a trial hearing for
the intentional commitment of a crime.93 He may resign from post
by providing written notice to the Chief Executive.94 The Commissioner may not engage in any other public or private activity,
whether remunerated or not, nor may he hold any position in a trade
union or political organization, without the authority of the Chief
Executive where this would involve exercising a public function
Id. § 6B(1).
Id. § 4.
89 Id. § 3(4).
90 Id. Sch. 1A, § 3(4). Funding is appropriated by the Legislative Council, id. §§
3(6), 6(3); Sch. 1A, § 1.
91 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 17.
92 Id. art. 23(2).
93 Id. art. 23(1).
94 Id. art. 23(3).
87
88
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contributing to the pursuit of the public interest.95
A notable difference between the two Special Administrative Regions is that the Macau Commissioner is formally appointed by the
Central People’s Government of the PRC, whereas the Ombudsman
of Hong Kong is formally appointed by the Chief Executive of Hong
Kong. However, it should be borne in mind that, in Macau, the ombudsman and anti-corruption functions are vested in a single
agency, whereas in Hong Kong the anti-corruption body is the separate ICAC (i.e., the Commissioner Against Corruption in Hong
Kong). Indeed, the head of the ICAC is, like his counterpart in Macau, appointed by the Central People’s Government on the nomination of the Chief Executive96—though he does not exercise the ombudsman function.
Another notable difference that supports the independence of
the CCAC from the executive—at least formally—is that it is provided for in the Basic Law of Macau. In particular, Article 59 of the
Basic Law of Macau states that the CCAC “shall function independently.”97 However, Article 59 also provides that the Commissioner “shall be accountable to the Chief Executive.”98 Accordingly,
despite its constitutional entrenchment, the CCAC is accountable to
the Chief Executive in Macau even though executive agencies are
essentially accountable to the CCAC in terms of their administrative
standards and practices. The CCAC must submit an annual report
to the Chief Executive to be published in the Official Gazette of Macau99 and the report is also made available on the CCAC website.
The CCAC’s income comes from the Government budget.100
The Control Yuan is the most structurally independent from the
executive of the four jurisdictions under review. It is clearly not part
of the executive, but an arm of the state in its own right under the
quinquepartite structure of the Taiwanese constitution.101 It is also
Id. art. 18.
Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 48(5).
97 Basic Law of Macau art. 59; Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2.
98 Basic Law of Macau art. 59.
99 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 15(1).
100 Administrative Bylaw No. 3/2009, Organization and Operation of the Service of
the Commission
against Corruption (Macau)
art.
27,
http://www.ccac.org.mo/index.php/en/about/related-laws?id=1247
[https://perma.cc/Q4S7-K3MR]; Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 40.
101 See Const. of the Republic of China, (Additional Articles) art. 7 (establishing
the Control Yuan as an arm of the state with the power to impeach, censure, and
audit other institutions); see also supra Section 2.4.
95
96
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the most firmly entrenched in constitutional terms by Additional
Article 7 of the ROC Constitution. Members are nominated and appointed by the President of the ROC with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, each member serving for a period of six years.102 They
must have a demonstrated period of service in designated professions or areas of service.103 The move away from the previous system, in which members were elected, at least signaled a move toward a system where members could not be openly partisan.
Indeed, members are required to be without party affiliation and to
independently exercise their powers and discharge their responsibilities in accordance with law.104 Nevertheless, appointments to the
Control Yuan are not without political controversy.105
Notwithstanding its structural independence, the Control Yuan
budget still comes from the Government and is approved by the
Legislative Yuan, thus it is not a completely autonomous institution.
As noted, members of the Control Yuan are appointed by the President of the ROC (part of the executive, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Control Yuan) with the consent of the Legislative
Yuan, and unlawful acts of the Control Yuan are justiciable in the
Judicial Yuan. Therefore, taken as a whole, the Control Yuan is subject to the usual system of checks and balances.106
It can therefore be seen that the ombudsman is part of the executive—and accountable to the ruling party—in Mainland China, but
is to varying degrees separate from the executive, though not entirely independent of it, in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The
most structurally independent of the institutions is the Control Yuan
of Taiwan.

Id. art. 7(2).
Organic Law of the Control Yuan art. 3.1.
104 Additional Articles art. 7(5).
105 See e.g., Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and the Judicial Facilitation of Dialogue Between Political Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean
and Taiwanese Experiences, 8(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. 911, 936 (2010) (recounting a significant legislative boycott in 2004 wherein President Chen’s nominations for Control
Yuan commissioners were blocked by the KMT legislative majority for a year until
the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislature must exercise its consent power
in a timely manner).
106 See CHANG ET AL., supra note 82, at 181–84.
102
103
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7. PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE POWERS
There are similarities among the main aspects of institutional
procedure. Each of the ombudsmen under review can, for example,
receive complaints from members of the public, private companies,
and government bodies. None of the institutions is first required to
have complaints filtered by legislators (though a legislative filter
was in place in Hong Kong until 1994), and all have broadly comparable powers to obtain evidence and summon witnesses in the process of their investigations. Importantly, all are under a formal duty
of secrecy or confidentiality in relation to the complainant. All four
institutions have the power to make their reports public, and all
have internal procedures to review their own decisions.
There are, however, some procedural differences between the
institutions. For instance, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong is the only
institution that does not have the power to process anonymous complaints. In addition, whereas there is a specific provision that enacts
a penalty for failure to cooperate with the investigations of the Ombudsman or CCAC, there is no such provision for failure to cooperate with the investigations of the MOS or the Control Yuan. None
of the four institutions’ decisions is subject to external review—unless there are grounds for alleging that the institutions themselves
have acted unlawfully—though, in Mainland China, the decisions
of lower supervisory organs are subject to external review by hierarchically superior organs. This does not, however, extend to the
MOS itself, as it is the highest organ of supervision in the state.
The substantive powers of the bodies under review bear significant similarity based primarily on a power to make recommendations. The Ombudsman, CCAC, and Control Yuan each have no
power to award remedies and no power to impose penalties on investigated bodies or persons. Both the Ombudsman and CCAC
have no power to compel an investigated body to implement their
respective recommendations, whilst the Control Yuan has an indirect power to do so. Though the MOS is not radically different in
terms of its substantive powers, it has an indirect power to award
remedies. It also has the power to impose a penalty on an investigated person and a partial power to impose a penalty on an investigated body in the form of a notice of criticism.
Dealing first with Mainland China, members of the public can
submit a complaint to the MOS. The Law on Administrative Supervision requires supervisory organs to institute a reporting system,
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whereby citizens shall have the right to make accusations or expositions against any administrative organ or public servant, or any persons appointed by state administrative organs, who are alleged to
have violated rules of administrative discipline.107 In addition, complaints can be made by legal persons (including companies) and
“other organizations,” which would apparently include other government and public bodies.108 Following the 2010 amendment to the
Law on Administrative Supervision, there is now express provision
for the submission of anonymous complaints, and a duty of confidentiality is placed on supervisory organs with regard to the rights,
interests, and information relating to informants.109 Complaints can
be submitted to the MOS by telephone, fax, e-mail, or the MOS website.
The MOS also conducts its own monitoring and inspection, and
can perform investigations on that basis. It even has staff working
in other government departments to monitor their administration.110
The MOS has been said to require approval from the Premier or Vice
Premiers to investigate ministerial or provincial level officials, but is
capable of initiating investigations of officials at the division or
county level without such approval.111
A case undergoes preliminary investigation, and can then be accepted for further investigation.112 The MOS has the power to obtain
documents, accounts and other evidence, and to require departments and individuals under supervision to explain or clarify questions relevant to the supervision.113 It also has the power to order

Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 6.
Id.
109 Id. art. 6, 46; Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, Adopted at the 63rd Executive
Meeting of the State Council (Sept. 6, 2004) art. 3 [hereinafter Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=55462&lib=law [https://perma.cc/J346-3XHL].
110 See Huang, supra note 21, at 836.
111 Id., at 837.
112 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 30–32; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 29.
113 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 19–20; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 10.
107
108
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departments and individuals under investigation not to sell or transfer property relevant to the case.114 Administrative departments
and authorities can be required to render assistance in the course of
handling cases involving violation of laws and rules of administrative discipline.115 Organizations and individuals within the jurisdiction of the supervisory organ have no power to refuse to undergo
supervision nor to obstruct supervisors in the performance of their
official duties.116 Nevertheless, departments and persons under supervision have a right to make representations in the course of an
investigation.117 Cases found not to be within the jurisdiction of the
supervisory organ are transferred to the body with authority to handle them, and criminal cases are transferred to the relevant judicial
body.118
The MOS may decide that the allegations in a complaint are not
adequately supported by facts or that the offence is minor, and either close the case or subject the investigated party to “criticism” and
“education.”119 If the MOS determines that there has been wrongdoing meriting punishment,120 disciplinary proceedings begin.
There can be a public hearing where the case is deemed sufficiently
important, difficult, or complicated.121 In the case of public officials
who are also Party members, there can also be a recommendation
that a discipline inspection committee under the CCDI impose Party

114 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 20(2); Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
arts. 12–13.
115 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 22; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 17–
20.
116 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 13.
117 Id. art. 34.
118 Id. art. 44.
119 Wedeman, supra note 20, at 904.
120 See Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 5 (“In supervision, education shall be combined with punishment, and supervision and inspection shall be combined with system construction.”). Prior to the 2010 amendment,
there was no reference to “system construction.” Cf. Law of the People’s Republic
of China on Administrative Supervision (adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress, May 9, 1997),
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=2b401469c8ac7f44&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/QK9U-VB2B].
121 Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Ministry of Supervision, People’s
Republic of China, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Mainland
China)].
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disciplinary sanctions, either in addition to, or instead of, administrative sanctions imposed under the MOS.122
Supervisory decisions and recommendations must be conveyed
in writing to the units or persons concerned.123 Administrative sanctions include a warning, recording of demerit, recording of serious
demerit, demotion, dismissal, or discharge.124 Major supervisory
decisions and recommendations of subsidiary organs must be submitted to the level of government to which the supervisory organ
belongs, and to the supervisory organ at the next highest level, for
consent. Major supervisory decisions and recommendations of the
MOS must be submitted to the State Council for consent.125
The MOS has the power to order departments and individuals
to cease violating laws, rules, regulations, and rules of administrative discipline,126 and to recommend suspension of duty to competent authorities for persons suspected of seriously violating rules of
administrative discipline.127 A supervisory decision must be implemented by the relevant departments and persons, whilst supervisory recommendations must be adopted unless there are justifiable
reasons not to do so.128 Corrective recommendations can be made
See Wedeman, supra note 20, at 904.
Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 36.
124 Id. art. 24(1); see also Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Servants (adopted at the 15th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People’s Congress, Apr. 27, 2005) art. 56, http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474983042347.htm
[https://perma.cc/D6BT2PS2] (“[D]isciplinary actions include: warning, recording of a demerit, recording
of a serious demerit, demotion, removal from office and discharge from public employment.”).
125 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 35. “Major” decisions and recommendations are purportedly defined in the Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 37 as those
dealing with “consequential matters for inspection and handling consequential or
complicated cases.” Definitions of these terms could potentially be found in the
Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland
China) arts. 28, 30, though they refer to different sections of the Law on Administrative Supervision.
126 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 19(3); Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 19(3).
127 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 20(4); Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 20(4).
128 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 25, 36; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 25.
122
123
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in a wide variety of situations, including where a party refuses to
enforce laws or rules; where decisions, decrees, or instructions
should be modified or revoked; where the interests of the state, collective, or citizen are impaired and remedial measures need to be
taken; where a party is ordered to make an open apology, cease to
perform their duties to accept inspection, resign, or be dismissed; in
“other situations wherein efforts shall be made to improve a diligent
and clean government system”; and “other situations for which a
supervisory recommendation is needed.”129 A notice of criticism can
also be circulated against departments or persons who violate provisions of the Law on Administrative Supervision.130 The MOS does
not appear to have the power to award remedies directly, but
through its recommendations can stipulate “remedial measures”
which include elimination of ill effects, rehabilitation of reputation,
extension of apology, and compensation for loss.131
A person aggrieved by the decision of a supervisory organ may
seek review by that organ, and then by the next highest supervisory
organ.132 The reviewing organ may hold a hearing and may make
its decision public.133 A higher supervisory organ reviewing such a
decision or recommendation may modify or revoke the decision, or
recommend to the lower supervisory organ to modify or revoke it.134
There is, however, no option for higher review of decisions and recommendations of the MOS, as it is the most senior supervisory organ in the state apparatus; nor does the MOS have the power to review decisions taken by supervisory organs at the county level, as
these are subject to review at the provincial level (though decisions
of supervisory organs at the provincial level are subject to review by
the MOS).135
In Hong Kong, there are two ways in which an investigation can
be initiated by the Ombudsman. The first is upon the receipt of a
complaint from a natural or legal person.136 Complaints may be
Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 23.
Id. art. 45.
131 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 23.
132 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 38, 40; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 39.
133 Asian Ombudsman Association (Mainland China), supra note 121, 6.
134 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 39, 41.
135 Id. art. 42.
136 The Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), § 7(1).
129
130
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made via an online complaint form, post, telephone, or in person.
They cannot be made anonymously.137 The Ombudsman has discretion on whether to fully investigate a complaint138 and can continue
or discontinue an investigation even if the complainant withdraws
the complaint.139 The second way in which an investigation can be
initiated is on the Ombudsman’s own motion by way of a “direct
investigation.”140
The Ombudsman has the power to regulate procedure as she
thinks fit, and has the power to obtain information and documents,
and to make such inquiries, as she thinks fit.141 She also has the
power to obtain evidence and summon witnesses.142 There is significant flexibility in terms of formal procedural requirements, but in
practice investigations are conducted by a specific team, each with
one or more areas of specialization and each headed by a Chief Investigation Officer. More senior staff, including the Deputy Ombudsman or Assistant Ombudsmen, may become involved in difficult or complex cases. Staff and advisers of the Ombudsman are
under a duty of secrecy in relation to matters arising from any investigation or complaint, and coming to their actual knowledge in
the exercise of their functions. However, this is qualified by permitting disclosure of relevant matters in the course of proceedings for
an offense under the Ombudsman Ordinance, reporting evidence of
any crime to such authority as they consider appropriate, and disclosing to a person any matter which is necessary to be disclosed for
the purposes of investigating a complaint or deciding whether an
investigation should be undertaken, continued, or discontinued.143
It may be noted that a duty of secrecy potentially sets a higher standard than a duty of confidentiality. Proceedings are almost always
conducted without a hearing, though the Ombudsman has the
power to hold a hearing if she thinks fit to do so.144
At the conclusion of an investigation, the Ombudsman may submit a report to the head of the affected organization. The report may
recommend that a particular remedy be given to the complainant or
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. § 10(1)(b).
Id. § 9.
Id. § 11.
Id. § 7(1).
Id. § 12(3).
Id. § 13.
Id. § 15.
Id. § 12(5).
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may make other recommendations.145 For example, it might be recommended that policies, procedures, or practices are modified to
avoid maladministration in the future. It might be recommended
that additional training is given to staff or that targets or objectives
are set. In certain circumstances, the Ombudsman may submit the
report and recommendations to the Chief Executive.146 If the Ombudsman considers that a serious irregularity or injustice has occurred, she may make a report to the Chief Executive which must
thereafter be laid before the Legislative Council.147 This offers an
avenue for political accountability in the event of serious irregularity or injustice related to maladministration.
Importantly, however, the Ombudsman has no power to grant a
remedy or to compel an investigated body to implement any
changes. In principle, the head of the investigated organization can
ignore her recommendations. In addition to the possibility of political accountability outlined above, however, the Ombudsman can
publish a report on an investigation (without disclosing the identity
of individuals) which affords the public an opportunity to learn of
instances of maladministration and consequent findings. As such,
it may not always be easy for recommendations to be ignored by the
head of the investigated organization as there is an avenue for both
executive and public scrutiny.
In addition to the Ombudsman’s power of investigation, her office can address a complaint by way of mediation where the parties
so agree and where the maladministration is not serious.148 In practice, there is also the option of initiating an “internal complaint handling” mechanism whereby, with the complainant’s consent, the
Ombudsman refers the complaint to an organization for investigation and direct reply to the complainant.149
There is no power of external merits review of the Ombudsman’s determinations. A request for review can be submitted by a
disappointed complainant, but this is processed internally and will

Id. § 16(1).
Id. § 16(1)–(3).
147 Id. § 16(5)–(6).
148 Id. § 11B; see also Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Ombudsman of
Hong Kong, 3 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Hong Kong)],
http://ofomb.ombudsman.hk/doc/yr22/pdf/en/2010_E_Ombudsman%20Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2U3-MCKU].
149 Asian Ombudsman Association (Hong Kong), 3.
145
146
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not necessarily result in modification of the original decision. Statistics show that the original decision is varied only in a small percentage of requests for review;150 however, this is not necessarily indicative of deficiency in the review process of the Ombudsman. The
same statistics disclose that only a very small percentage of complainants seek a request for review. There can be a range of reasons
for this, including satisfaction with the original decision, insufficient
confidence in the likelihood of successful review, and being unaware that review can be requested. If the Ombudsman acts unlawfully, her decision or conduct is of course susceptible to judicial review.
In Macau, members of the public can submit complaints to the
CCAC by telephone, fax, e-mail, post, or in person.151 The CCAC
also has the power to initiate its own investigations. When a complaint is received, it undergoes preliminary analysis. If categorized
as showing signs of corruption, it is allocated for preliminary investigation by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and is thereafter subject to a
full investigation or filed as not fit for investigation. At the conclusion of a full investigation, the case is referred to the Public Prosecutions Office or filed on the basis of insufficient evidence.
If showing signs of administrative deficiency, a case is allocated
for preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman Bureau. Again, if
not fit for investigation, it is filed. Otherwise, there are three ways
in which the case can be handled. First, it can be formally investigated. Second, if there is no sign of any violation of law and it is
deemed more appropriate for another body to handle the case, the
CCAC will refer it to the body concerned and follow up on progress,
provided that the complainant’s consent is secured.152 Third, where
the case is deemed properly to be subject to administrative or judicial remedies, the CCAC may refer the parties to the relevant bodies.153 The CCAC has the discretion to close proceedings where the

150 See THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ADMINISTRATION WING, CHIEF
SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION’S OFFICE, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL BRIEFING PAPER (LC
PAPER NO. CB(4)513/12-13(01)): ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT MECHANISM TO
REVIEW
THE
DECISIONS
OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN
(Mar.
26,
2013),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/ajls/papers/aj0326cb4-513-1e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE4H-KSCA] (citing statistics for requests for review received, and reviews conducted, from 2009 through Feb. 28, 2013).
151 Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau), supra note 73, at 6.
152 Id., at 5.
153 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 13.
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facts lie beyond its jurisdiction or where there is insufficient evidence to support the investigation.154
The Commissioner Against Corruption, deputy commissioners,
and certain other staff have free access to all places of work of the
Administration of Macau.155 The Commissioner and his deputy
commissioners enjoy the status of a criminal police authority in relation to penal procedure acts within their powers,156 and in criminal
inquiries, CCAC staff may be authorized by the Commissioner to
carry and use weapons of a type and caliber approved by decision
of the Chief Executive of Macau.157 The CCAC is empowered to examine documents, conduct inquiries, and obtain testimony, and
bodies under investigation are required to comply with timeframes
stipulated by the CCAC in this regard.158 All natural and legal persons are required to cooperate with the CCAC,159 and public entities
within the scope of the CCAC’s jurisdiction are required to cooperate and to carry out such investigations, inquiries, and other
measures as necessary.160 A person who refuses to testify to the
CCAC or who fails to do so without justification, or who intentionally and unjustifiably obstructs the performance of the CCAC’s duties, is liable to be subject to the criminal penalty for disobedience.161
There is a duty of confidentiality in relation to the CCAC’s handling
of the facts of cases.162
The CCAC is under a duty to communicate a final decision to
the party requesting its intervention.163 Upon the completion of an
investigation, it may report any findings of illegal acts to the relevant authorities.164 Recommendations can be made directly to the
authorities where illegal or unfair administrative acts or procedures
are identified.165 The Commissioner Against Corruption is neither
civilly nor criminally liable for a recommendation or preparatory
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. art. 12(3).
Id. art. 35.
Id. art. 11(3).
Id. art. 36(1).
Id. arts. 4(2)–(4), 6(2), 12(2).
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6(1).
Id. art. 14.
Id. arts. 20, 26.
Id. art. 12(4).
Id. art. 4(6).
Id. art. 4(12).
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acts leading toward a recommendation.166 If the investigated entity
does not fully accept recommendations made by the CCAC, it must
give its reasoned reply within a specified period of time.167 The
CCAC must then decide whether the partial or non-acceptance of its
recommendations is justified; if not, it may pass the case to the hierarchical superior or the supervisory entity of the investigated body
and, once the hierarchical chain has been exhausted, it must inform
the Chief Executive of Macau.168 It may also inquire into the progress of any criminal or disciplinary proceedings filed with the relevant authorities.169 In terms of review mechanisms for the disappointed complainant, the CCAC will not reexamine or give further
response to a complaint on which a decision has been made, unless
sufficiently substantial further evidence has been provided by the
complainant.170
The CCAC may report on the results of its investigations to the
Chief Executive.171 It can also make recommendations on the interpretation, amendment, or repeal of legislation, or recommend new
legislation where it considers that there are deficiencies in existing
legal provisions with regard to the rights, freedoms, safeguards, or
legitimate interests of individuals.172 Further, it can make recommendations to the Chief Executive for the introduction of new
measures to combat corruption and illicit or unethical practices, and
to improve public administration.173 There is a Monitoring Committee on the Discipline of CCAC Personnel comprising a president and
four members, appointed by the Chief Executive, which receives
complaints about CCAC personnel.174
Finally, in Taiwan, investigations are either assigned to members of the Control Yuan upon receipt of a complaint, initiated by
such members, or commissioned by the Control Yuan and entrusted
to a related organization for investigation.175 The process for receiv-

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 12(5).
Id. art. 12(6).
Id. art. 4(7).
Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau), supra note 73, at 6.
Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 4(8).
Id. art. 4(9).
Id. art. 4(10), (11).
Id. art. 38(3).
See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: Why and How Does the Control Yuan Exercise
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ing and handling written complaints is set out in regulations enacted by the Control Yuan. It has the power to receive complaints
from the public and from agencies and organizations, in addition to
the power of Control Yuan members to initiate investigations.176
Complaints can be lodged by post, fax, via the Control Yuan website, in person at the Control Yuan, or in person to Control Yuan
members when they are on a circuit supervision trip—members of
the Control Yuan not only inspect the central authorities, but also
local authorities through circuit supervision trips.177 Each member
of the Control Yuan is expected to visit a different location in Taiwan
each quarter of the year.
Upon the receipt of a complaint in relation to which there are no
existing cases, the complaint is dealt with by a member of the Control Yuan. If the member approves the request, the case is forwarded
to a relevant committee.178 Complaints are dismissed if they are beyond the powers and jurisdiction of the Control Yuan, require a lawsuit to be filed against a judicial agency or court martial, or require
the issuing of a petition, appeal or administrative litigation.179 A
complaint will not be investigated where it has been submitted to
administrative remedial procedures, judicial proceedings, or a
higher or responsible agency for handling, unless the defendant is
alleged to have committed malfeasance or serious misconduct.180
The Control Yuan can, but usually does not, investigate a case pending in a court of law.181 It is possible for a complaint to be submitted

the
Power
of
Investigation?,
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7764&ctNode=1825&mp=21
[https://perma.cc/3MW4-3EDJ] (explaining the investigative structure of the Control Yuan).
176 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 4; Regulations for Receiving and Handling People’s Written Complaints (Control Yuan) (enacted by the 22nd Control Yuan plenary meeting, 20 July 1948, amended 1955-1998) art. 3 [hereinafter Complaint Regulations (Taiwan)].
177 Ger, supra note 28, at 36.
178 See Complaint Regulations (Taiwan) art. 9 (establishing the system for processing people’s written complaints).
179 Id. art. 11.
180 Id. art. 12.
181 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: Can the Control Yuan Investigate Cases Pending
in
a
Law
Court?,
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7766&ctNode=1825&mp=21
[https://perma.cc/48TK-AB2Q] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (describing circumstances in which the Control Yuan can investigate cases pending in a court of law).
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anonymously, but no investigation will be made on such a complaint unless the defendant is alleged to have committed malfeasance or serious misconduct.182 If an investigation is made on the
basis of an anonymous complaint, no reply is issued by the Control
Yuan following processing of the complaint.183 No replies are issued
where the complaint is similar to others lodged by the same complainant in a short period of time, or where the complaint includes
empty, absurd, or insulting remarks.184 The Control Yuan has the
power to investigate and obtain files, records and documents, and
may summon the complainant and the investigated person for questioning.185
The powers of the Control Yuan comprise impeachment, censure, and the proposal of corrective measures—in addition to the
power of audit which is beyond the scope of this Article. Impeachment proceedings are required to be initiated by two or more members of the Control Yuan, and investigated and voted upon by a
committee of not less than nine members.186 If nine or more members, excluding the initiators of the case, conclude for a determination of impeachment, the case is turned over to a competent disciplinary organ for action,187 typically the Commission on the
Disciplinary Sanctions of Functionaries (“CDSF”) of the Judicial
Yuan. Proceedings of impeachment are not disclosed to the public
if and until the case is turned over to the competent disciplinary organ.188 At the same time as the case is transferred, the Control Yuan
announces its motion of impeachment in a press release and publishes it in the Control Yuan bulletin.189
Where the Control Yuan considers a violation of law or dereliction of duty in an impeachment case to be sufficiently serious as to
require immediate remedy, it can require the offender’s superior to

Complaint Regulations (Taiwan) art. 12.
Id. art. 13.
184 Id.
185 Control Act (Taiwan) arts. 26–27.
186 Zhonghua Minguo Xianfa (Constitution of the Republic of China) Additional Articles art. 7(3) (1947).
187 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 8; Enforcement Rules of the Control Act
(amended 11 February 2009) art. 10.
188 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 13.
189 Enforcement Rules of the Control Act art. 10(2).
182
183
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take immediate remedial action.190 Where it considers that an impeached public functionary has violated criminal or military law, it
is required to turn the case over to the relevant disciplinary organ
and a competent court or court martial.191 A competent organ or
court to which an impeachment case has been transferred is required to take immediate action.192
The potential consequences of impeachment are discharge, suspension, degradation, salary cut, demerit and admonition.193 Importantly, the Control Yuan does not have the power to impose disciplinary sanctions194—it has the power of impeachment, but
disciplinary power resides in the relevant disciplinary organ,
namely the CDSF. This is in line with Article 77 of the ROC Constitution which states that the Judicial Yuan shall have jurisdiction
over cases concerning disciplinary measures against public functionaries.
If a member of the Control Yuan considers a public functionary
to be guilty of violation of law or dereliction of duty which requires
suspension of duty or urgent remedy, he may submit a written censure to be examined and determined by three or more members. A
censure is forwarded to the superior of the functionary or, if the case
involves a violation of criminal or military law, to the competent
court or court martial.195 A censure which reaches the superior of
the functionary may result in suspension of the functionary from
duty.196 If the superior considers that no action should be taken, he
is required to submit his justifications to the Control Yuan,197 though
if found by two members of the Control Yuan to have taken inappropriate action, the superior himself may face impeachment.198 As
with impeachment, proceedings of censure are not disclosed to the
public if and until the case is turned over to a competent disciplinary
Control Act (Taiwan) art. 14.
Id. art. 15.
192 Id. art. 16.
193 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What are the Differences Among the Powers of
Impeachment,
Censure,
and
Corrective
Measures?,
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7785&ctNode=1825&mp=21
[https://perma.cc/UH4B-ANDP] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (differentiating the
powers of impeachment, censure and corrective measures).
194 Ma, supra note 29, at 426.
195 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 19.
196 Id. art. 21.
197 Id. art. 22.
198 Id.
190
191
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organ.199 Also as with impeachment, a competent organ or court to
which a censure case has been transferred is required to take immediate action.200 A potential consequence of censure is suspension
from duty or other immediate action.201
The Control Yuan has the power to propose corrective measures
to the Executive Yuan and its subordinate organs.202 Other Yuans
and the office of the President do not fall under the scope of this
power, thus it to some extent embodies the Control Yuan’s ombudsman functions proper. Upon receipt of corrective measures, the
body in question is required to make improvements immediately or
take other appropriate action, and inform the Control Yuan in writing on those improvements or actions. If no reply is received within
two months, the Control Yuan may inquire of the organ in question.203 If the organ refuses to reply or gives an unsatisfactory explanation, the Control Yuan can initiate a case of impeachment or censure against the head of the organization in question.204 Whilst it
therefore cannot directly compel the Executive Yuan or its subsidiary organs to implement recommendations, the possibility of impeachment or censure of the head of the organization under review
incentivizes compliance.
Should a complainant disagree with the decision of a member of
the Control Yuan, he may request, but is not entitled to, reinvestigation. There is provision for internal review of Control Yuan decisions insofar as an impeachment case that is not approved can be
requested for review by the proposing members, in which case it is
transferred to a new committee comprising 9-13 members for final
decision.205

Id. art. 23.
Id.
201 CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What are the Differences Among the Powers of Impeachment,
Censure,
and
Corrective
Measures?,
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7785&ctNode=1825&mp=21
[https://perma.cc/UH4B-ANDP] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
202 Control Act (Taiwan) arts. 1–2, 24.
203 Id. art. 25.
204 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What Should an Organization do After Receiving a Case of Corrective Measures Proposed by the Control Yuan?,
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7763&ctNode=1825&mp=21
[https://perma.cc/4AH4-LMQB] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (describing the consequences of failure to properly address a corrective measure).
205 Ger, supra note 28, at 24.
199
200
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8. EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY
Institutional effectiveness is not easy to measure, less still when
comparing jurisdictions where the institutions under evaluation
serve varying purposes and operate within considerably different
legal, constitutional, political, and social contexts. Public confidence
in the institution may be an indicator that it is fulfilling its function
with a degree of success. However, this is difficult to measure.206
Short of an extensive and wide-ranging empirical study across the
four jurisdictions, beyond the scope of this research,207 the best indicators of effectiveness and transparency come with a contextual
comparison of the extent to which formal legal frameworks create a
suitable environment for promoting robust standards of public administration, and whether stated objectives appear to be met.
Structurally, the situation in Mainland China is a cause for concern. It has been pointed out that supervisory organs subsidiary to
the MOS are part of the local governments which they monitor. In
addition, the heads of the local branches of the MOS and CCDI are
equivalent to or lower in rank than the heads of local governments
or their subordinate bureaus.208 This means that, even though there
is the possibility of seeking review from the supervisory organ immediately above that whose decision is being challenged, there
might be insufficient incentives for the original supervisory organ to
rigorously monitor departments and persons within their jurisdiction, or to properly process complaints received about such departments and persons. Deserving cases might therefore never have the
possibility of reaching the more senior supervisory organ, including
the MOS itself.

206 See e.g., Brenda Danet, Toward A Method To Evaluate The Ombudsman Role, 10
ADMINISTRATION & SOC’Y 335–70 (1978) (providing background literature on the assessment of ombudsman effectiveness); S. E. Aufrecht and M. Hertogh, Evaluating
Ombudsman Systems, in RIGHTING WRONGS: THE OMBUDSMAN IN SIX CONTINENTS 389402 (Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings eds., 2000) (background on the ombudsman); Anita Stuhmcke, Evaluating Ombudsman: A Case Study in Developing a Quantitative Methodology to Measure the Performance of the Ombudsman, 10 THE INT.
OMBUDSMAN YEARBOOK 23-82 (2006) (discussing quantitative methodology for
measuring ombudsman performance).
207 An empirical study of ombudsman institutions in Greater China would be
useful, but particularly challenging in Mainland China given informational and
transparency deficits.
208 Huang, supra note 21, at 842.
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In addition, supervisory organs must submit reports on the results of inspections to the level of government to which they belong,
or to the supervisory organ at a higher level.209 This has been cited
as a factor negatively affecting the effectiveness of the Mainland
Chinese supervisory organs in limiting maladministration, in addition to understaffing of supervisory organs, a lack of sufficient
power to impose sanctions, dependence on government funding,
and the incapability of dealing with high-level corruption.210 Governmental consent can also be required for administrative sanctions
to take effect,211 undermining the independence of supervisory organs.
These weaknesses in the structural design of the MOS and the
broader supervisory system can translate into limited effectiveness.
However, even where formal rules and institutions seem well designed, there remains the possibility for divergence between those
rules and institutions, and actual practice. Mainland China’s comparative lack of transparency accentuates this possibility. As an example, persons assisting the charging or provision of information
against serious violations of laws or rules of administrative discipline can be rewarded by the MOS.212 In addition, administrative
sanctions are due to be imposed on any person who retaliates
against a complainant, accuser, exposer or supervisor, with the potential for criminal responsibility.213 On the face of it, these rules
incentivize formal reporting by complainants or persons assisting
investigations, and disincentivize reprisal by the authorities.
Nevertheless, challenges remain in Mainland China in terms of
complainants’ fear of retaliation.214 This has been documented in
relation to another channel for persons to express grievances about
public officers and the conduct of public administration, namely the

209 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 30(3); Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)
art. 28.
210 PEERENBOOM, supra note 83, at 416–17.
211 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 24.
212 Id. art. 3; Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China) art.
8.
213 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 47; Police Law
(Mainland China) art. 46; Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland
China).
214 Yong, supra note 19, at 17–18.
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system of complaint letters and visits.215 The effectiveness of this
system has been questioned by allegations of arbitrariness216 and human rights violations.217 Indeed, similar allegations have been made
of the CCDI interrogation system, though it has been suggested that
there may recently have been some improvement in that system,
and that it may—notwithstanding the controversial techniques employed, and in utilitarian terms—be an effective anti-corruption
mechanism.218 However, since the 2010 amendment to the Law on
Administrative Supervision, there is express provision for the submission of anonymous complaints,219 though there is no data to attest to the practical effectiveness of this provision. A duty of confidentiality has also been imposed on supervisory organs with regard
to the rights, interests, and information relating to informants,220 and
provisions are in place to support the impartiality of supervisors.221
It should also be noted that there have been formal steps taken in
Mainland China to improve transparency and access to information
in public administration, as with the introduction of regulations on
the disclosure of government information in 2007.222
The potential for misalignment between formal rules and institutions on the one hand, and actual practice on the other, was recognized by Huang Yasheng. It was, however, argued that it is still
215 See Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China). See generally Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42
STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006) (arguing that the xinfang system is fundamentally a multipurpose tool of governance, rather than an institution of particularized justice
based on legal norms).
216 Thornton, supra note 65, at 14.
217 Human Rights Watch (Sophie Richardson ed.), An Alleyway in Hell: China’s
Abusive Black Jails (Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/12/alleyway-hell/chinas-abusive-black-jails [https://perma.cc/KH8A-R8R2].
218 See Dui Hua Foundation, Corruption, Shuanggui and Rule of Law (June 27,
2013),
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/06/corruption-shuanggui-andrule-of-law.html [https://perma.cc/6F8J-AYVM] (describing shuanggui and signs
of efforts to bring it under the rule of law); See also CCDI & MOS, Notice on Several
Questions Regarding the use of Liangzhi and Shuanggui Measures by Discipline Inspection
and Supervision Organs (June 5, 1998).
219 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 6.
220 Id. arts. 6, 46.
221 Id. art. 14; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 33.
222 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information (promulgated by the State Council, May 1, 2008) The China Center, Yale Law School, February 2009, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-Regs-English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KN8L-8BBE].
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important to examine formal rules and institutions because, first,
formal institutions often give rise to incentives and condition behavior, and second, the central administration appears to adjust institutional design to overcome problems or achieve political objectives.223
That justifies an examination of the formal machinery for administrative supervision even if there is the possibility for divergence
from actual practice. In addition, as this Article aims to a compare
and contrast the ombudsman machinery in each of the Greater Chinese jurisdictions, a finding may well be that there is in Mainland
China the greatest potential for misalignment between formal institutions and actual practice in administrative supervision. That
would of course count as a weakness of the system relative to the
other systems under review.
Some indication of institutional effectiveness can be drawn from
published statistics, though this is dependent on the credibility and
methodology of the body compiling the statistics and the selection
of statistics made available. The MOS publishes limited statistics on
its investigation activities, but without significant elaboration on the
number and type of complaints received.224 Reports on individual
cases are made available on the MOS website, but these tend to be
short and appear to be selective.225 This is again an indictment on
its transparency.
The most recently available Annual Report published by the
Ombudsman of Hong Kong, spanning April 2016 to March 2017, reported that for the year under review 4,862 complaints were received, slightly lower than previous annual figures. Of those complaints, 2,556 were concluded by inquiry, 218 by investigation and
133 by mediation. 1,102 cases were closed on the basis of insufficient
grounds, and 965 were closed on the basis that the Ombudsman was
legally bound to do so, including absence of jurisdiction. The top
five organizations complained against, where the Ombudsman pursued cases to conclusion, were the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (476), Housing Department (456), Buildings Department (216), Lands Department (207) and Transport Department
223 Huang, supra note 21, at 840-41. The Pilot Program may also be considered
in this context.
224 See Ministry of Supervision, 2016 Annual Report on Information Disclosure
(Apr.
11,
2017),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/xxgknb/201704/t20170411_97156.html
[https://perma.cc/4HMC-KJLP] (describing activities of the MOS in 2016).
225 See
Disciplinary
Review,
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jlsc/
[https://perma.cc/GSZ6-GLLY].
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(171). Of all cases concluded by way of full investigation, 60.5%
were found unsubstantiated, 22.5% partly substantiated (an increase
of over nine percentage points), 11.0% substantiated, 5.5% unsubstantiated but other inadequacies found, and 0.5% withdrawn or
discontinued. The top five forms of maladministration substantiated by a full investigation were error, wrong advice or decision
(27.4%), ineffective control (19.5%), delay or inaction (16.8%), faulty
procedures (14.2%) and lack of response to complainant/enquirer
(7.1%). Eleven direct investigations were completed, examining a
range of issues including tree management, the Marine Department’s follow-up mechanism on recommendations made in Marine
Incident Investigation Reports, temporary closure of public swimming pools and beaches due to lifeguard shortages, and regulation
of kindergarten application fees.226
Limited data is published by the Ombudsman on the compliance
rate by public bodies with her recommendations. For the year under
review, the Ombudsman made a total of 254 recommendations, of
which 83.1% were accepted for implementation—almost identical to
figures for the previous year—and 16.9% were still under consideration by the end of the audit period.227 This ostensibly means that
no recommendations were rejected for implementation. In addition,
133 cases were settled through mediation, similar to the two previous years, though a sharp increase on three years previously.228 It
should be emphasized that it is technically open to an investigated
body to decline to implement the Ombudsman’s recommendations.
However, whether in the spirit of pursuing good administrative
practice, for fear of political or reputational consequences (such as
in reports forwarded by the Ombudsman to the Chief Executive,
those laid before the Legislative Council, or those on which the media reports),229 the Ombudsman has secured a very high rate of compliance with her recommendations.

226 The Ombudsman, Hong Kong, ANNUAL REPORT: MAINTAINING IMPARTIALITY
WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOUR (2017), http://ofomb.ombudsman.hk/doc/yr29/en/mo-

bile/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2PN-CV33].
227 Id. at 25.
228 Id. at 28.
229 It is conceivable that legal consequences could result in circumstances in
which an investigated body ignored recommendations in relation to a particular
case of maladministration, and the same form of maladministration arises again in
a manner which is unlawful. There is a possibility of arguing in an application for
judicial review that the body, in failing to take into account the Ombudsman’s rec-
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The available data would suggest that the Ombudsman is an effective form of administrative supervision in Hong Kong, though
two caveats are worth noting. First, these figures are provided by
the Ombudsman and their veracity and accuracy is dependent on
honest and transparent reporting. Second, subsequent annual reports do not disclose whether and to what extent the recommendations still under consideration by the end of the preceding audit period were accepted for implementation. Accordingly, for the period
from April 2016 to March 2017, the outstanding 16.9% of recommendations which had yet to be accepted for implementation could have
been wholly or partly rejected (or accepted) following the conclusion of the relevant audit period.
The most recently published Annual Report of the CCAC of Macau is for 2016. Overall, 839 complaints were received from the public (almost a 10% increase on the previous year, and of which 411
were made anonymously or with a request for anonymity), 29 cases
were initiated by the CCAC on its own motion (a 190% increase on
the previous year), 19 were investigated at the request of overseas
authorities (a 375% increase on the previous year), and 23 were referred to the CCAC by other public bodies (over 53% increase on the
previous year). In terms of its ombudswork, 658 complaints were
received. Of those, the top five areas to which complaints referred
were systems relating to public service positions (186), meteorological analysis (80), traffic affairs (42), municipal affairs (40) and disciplined services management and their law enforcement (37). Thirty
complaints were determined to be beyond the competency of the
CCAC. The anti-corruption arm of the CCAC received 252 criminal
cases qualifying for handling, and concluded 182 cases. The Annual
Report also stated that twelve cases investigated by the CCAC had
been adjudicated in court in 2016, mostly involving corruption,
fraud, forgery, breach of confidentiality, or abuse of power. The
cases resulted in a mixture of verdicts including imprisonment for
periods ranging from six months to twelve years and six months,
payment orders for between 6,000 and 420,000 MOP, and acquittals.230

ommendations, had failed to take into account a relevant consideration—a recognized ground of judicial review in Hong Kong.
230 Commission Against Corruption, Macao Special Administrative Region,
2016 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION OF MACAO (2017),
http://www.ccac.org.mo/en/intro/download/rep2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JT9-XUJJ].
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The CCAC publishes some information in its Annual Report
about the compliance of investigated bodies with its recommendations. However, these are presented as case studies and give only a
small sample of cases, meaning that the CCAC might simply have
chosen for elaboration cases giving the impression that their work is
effective, and perhaps more effective than it actually is. Indeed, of
the eight case studies included in the Annual Report for 2016, investigated bodies accepted the CCAC’s recommendations for implementation in 100% of cases. It may be that the CCAC’s recommendations are accepted for implementation with a similarly high rate
of regularity as those of the Ombudsman in Hong Kong, but it is not
possible to draw this conclusion in the absence of relevant quantitative data. The coverage in the Annual Report of positive cases might
also be an exercise in promoting public confidence in the utility of
the CCAC as a mechanism for grievance redress, but it again does
not necessarily provide a representative sample of its caseload.
Despite the relatively extensive scope of the Taiwanese Control
Yuan’s jurisdiction, it cannot directly apply sanctions or compel investigated bodies to implement recommendations. In this sense, it
has been described in Taiwan as a “tiger without teeth.”231 However, the possibility for the head of an organization who fails to implement recommendations to be impeached provides an incentive
to act on those recommendations. It is possible for an individual to
be impeached and for the CDSF to decide against imposing meaningful disciplinary measures. However, there are significant reputational consequences for a person found impeached, manifesting,
for example, in difficulties securing career progression or in seeking
election to public office. As such, an impeached person will sometimes resign from office before the CDSF issues a final decision on
disciplinary measures,232 suggesting that the “tiger” is not toothless
or does not require teeth to be effective.
The most recently published Annual Report of the Control Yuan
is for 2016. A total of 13,666 complaints were received, similar to the
previous year, of which the top three categories, accounting for
80.4% of all complaints received, related to judicial affairs (4,890),
domestic affairs (3,907) or financial and economic affairs (2,192),
again similar to that of the previous year. The Control Yuan investigated 270 cases, of which 181 were assigned investigations and 89

231
232

Ger, supra note 28, at 27, 55.
Id. at 25.
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were self-initiated. In the report for 2014, it was documented that
71.3% of investigated cases related to the Executive Yuan and its
subordinate agencies, 19.3% to local government, 5.7% to the Judicial Yuan and its subordinate agencies, 0.8% to the Presidential Office and its subordinate agencies, 0.5% to the Examination Yuan and
its subordinate agencies, and 2.5% to unspecified others.233 No statistic of this kind appears in the reports for 2015 or 2016. The Control
Yuan impeached sixty-nine persons (more than double the figure for
the previous year), of whom eighteen were elected civil officials.
Eight of the impeached persons were military officials—perhaps unusual as the military tends in other jurisdictions to evade open civil
scrutiny in the name of defense and national security. In 2014, a total
of 419 persons were punished by their agencies for minor misconduct on the request of the Control Yuan, but no comparable statistic
appears in the reports for 2015 or 2016.
Eighty-two corrective measures were proposed by the Control
Yuan—similar to the previous year—the top five of which related to
domestic and minority affairs (28), financial and economic affairs
(16), transportation and procurement affairs (15), national defense
and intelligence affairs (10) and educational and cultural affairs (8).
83% of complaints received, and 41.8% of complaints investigated,
by the Control Yuan related to human rights, broadly in line with
the previous annual figures. The National Audit Office of the Control Yuan investigated twenty-two cases.234 The overall picture of
the Control Yuan is one of relatively effective supervision, though it
appears that only a small number of complaints lead to impeachment, censure or the proposal of corrective measures. No data was
presented on the compliance rate of investigated bodies with proposed corrective measures, thus its effectiveness in that regard cannot be determined.

233 CONTROL YUAN, Annual Report of the Control Yuan, 2014 (2015),
http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?fileName=5122417465471.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M75Y-4FXC]. These figures are rounded to the nearest 0.1%.
234 CONTROL YUAN, Annual Report of the Control Yuan, 2016 (2017),
http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?fileName=7761615971.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7EC-Q4C7].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/3

2017]

Four “Chinese” Models of Administrative Supervision

483

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are similarities between the ombudsman institutions of
Greater China. Each is primarily oriented toward supervision of the
public sector, with jurisdiction over administrative malpractice and
deficiency in government departments and non-governmental public bodies. Each can act on the basis of complaints received from
members of the public, private companies and government bodies,
and can perform direct investigations of their own volition. Complaints are not filtered by legislators, and each ombudsman conveys
its primary substantive power through the making of recommendations with no general power to award remedies.
However, these similarities seem too thin to bind the institutions
to a single paradigm of administrative supervision. There are significant differences among the institutions in terms of their organizational bases, powers, processes, and practices—and in the context
of the specific jurisdiction where each operates. Only in Mainland
China is the ombudsman part of the executive proper, and is the
work of the ombudsman shared with, and apparently subordinate
to, the disciplinary arm of the ruling political party. Only in Macau
and Taiwan is the ombudsman constitutionally entrenched, but only
in Taiwan is it on an equal constitutional footing with the executive.
The ombudsman’s budget ultimately comes from the executive in
each jurisdiction, though it is allocated or approved by the legislature in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Ombudsman of Hong Kong
alone performs no active anti-corruption function, has no general
jurisdiction over maladministration in the police force, and has no
power to investigate anonymous complaints. Only the MOS in
Mainland China has the power to impose penalties on investigated
persons, whereas the other institutions can only make recommendations or indirectly secure compliance to varying extents. Only the
Control Yuan actively monitors human rights compliance.
There is no overall pattern to these characteristics. They point to
underlying differences in the way that the ombudsman institution
is conceived in each jurisdiction, the way in which it operates, the
powers that it exercises, and the ends to which its powers are exercised. Mainland China is an obvious outlier in terms of the status,
role and method of the institution; and the political context in which
the MOS operates is substantially different to that found in the other
jurisdictions under review. However, Taiwan is also an outlier in
terms of the constitutional foundation of the Control Yuan and the
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fact that its key power is that of impeachment—one usually found
in legislatures. Hong Kong could also be classified as an outlier in
terms of its Ombudsman’s minimal oversight of anti-corruption and
the police.
It is to be expected that each institution is a product of local historical, cultural, political and social contexts. However, notwithstanding continuing uncertainty over the status of Taiwan, the jurisdictions under review have broadly been on a path of political,
constitutional, and economic convergence. The variation between
the institutions and their respective systemic contexts spells difficulties for a unified “Chinese” conception of the ombudsman. Any future attempt to align or harmonize the ombudsman institutions
would face significant obstacles from the conceptual to the practical.
Although the ombudsman is undoubtedly not unique in this regard,
it is illuminating that even in a comparison of the institutions performing this relatively innocuous function across Greater China,
there is considerable diversity from the level of practical rules to
constitutional first principles. The ombudsman may have become a
global phenomenon, but even in an area as politically, constitutionally, and economically associated as Greater China, there is no single
paradigm of administrative supervision. It is common for officials
in Mainland China to describe aspects of its legal, political, and economic systems as having “Chinese characteristics,” but this portrayal simply does not work in a comparison of the state ombudsman institutions in Greater China. None of the jurisdictions under
review can make an exclusive claim to “Chineseness” in the characteristics of its public sector ombudsman. Just as Greater China comprises four, diverse constituent jurisdictions, so it exhibits four diverse “Chinese” models of administrative supervision.
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10. TABLE 1
Ministry of
Supervision
(Mainland
China)

Ombudsman
(Hong Kong)

CCAC
(Macau)

Control Yuan
(Taiwan)

Year of
establishment

1949;
abolished
1959;
re-established
1987

1989

1999

1931; officially
established
under ROC
Constitution
1948

Major
relevant
legislation

Law on
Ombudsman Organic Law of
the CommisAdministrative Ordinance
Supervision
sion Against
Corruption

Control Act

Constitutional
entrenchment
of institution

No

No

Yes
(Basic Law of
Macau)

Yes (ROC
Constitution)

Independent
institution

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Institution has
clearly defined /
distinct
jurisdiction
from other
supervisory
bodies

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Formally part
of
executive

Yes

No

No

No

Government

Government;
budget allocated by
Legislative
Council

Government

Government
allocated
budget;
approved by
Legislative
Yuan

Financially
reliant on
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Head of
institution
appointed by

President of
PRC on nomination of
Premier with
approval of
Standing Committee of National People’s
Congress

Head of
institution
removed /
dismissed by

No specific
provision

Chief ExecuCentral
tive of Hong
People’s
Kong with ap- Government
proval by res(“PRC”) on
olution of
recommendaLegislative
tion of Chief
Council
Executive of
Macau

No specific
provision

Circumstances in
which head of
institution can
be removed /
dismissed

No specific
provision

Inability to
discharge
functions of
office; misbehavior

No specific
provision

Substantive
focus of
institution’s
work

Political, economic, and administrative
discipline

Maladministration

Power to
investigate
corruption

Yes

No235

Yes

Yes

No specific
provision236

Limited

Limited

Yes

Monitors human rights
compliance

Chief
Executive of
Hong Kong

[Vol. 39:2

Central PeoPresident of
ple’s Govern- ROC with conment (“PRC”) sent of Legislaon nomination
tive Yuan
of Chief Executive of Macau

No specific
provision

Corruption
Violation of
and
law, neglect of
administrative duty, and maladministration
illegality

This is properly in the domain of the ICAC.
A supervisory organ may make recommendations in situations including
those “where the interests of the State or the collective or the lawful rights and interests of citizens are impaired and remedial measures need to be taken” (Law on
Administrative Supervision (Mainland China), art.23(3)), however no specific mention is made of human rights.
235
236
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Jurisdiction
over government departments

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Jurisdiction
over non-governmental
public bodies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Jurisdiction
over police

Yes

No237

Yes

Yes

Jurisdiction
over courts

Unclear238

No239

No specific
provision

Yes

Jurisdiction
over private
bodies

Partly240

No

Partly

No

Can receive
complaints

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Except in relation to the Code on Access to Information.
It is unclear whether the MOS has formal jurisdiction over courts and
judges (consider Law of the People’s Republic of China on Judges (adopted at the
22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress,
30 June 2001, arts. 32–35 and 44-47)). The Law on Administrative Supervision
(Mainland China), art. 43, states that where a supervisory organ, in the course of
handling a matter under supervision, finds that the matter under investigation does
not fall within the scope of the supervisory organ’s functions and duties, it shall
transfer it to the unit that has the authority to handle it, which could include the
transfer of a legal case to court. It is specifically provided that a criminal case be
transferred to a judicial organ. However, it is further provided in the same article
that the unit or organ that accepts the matter so transferred shall notify the relevant
supervisory organ of how the matter is handled—it is unclear what happens if the
unit or organ fails to do so, or reports back in a manner deemed unsatisfactory by
the supervisory organ. The People’s Courts and the procuratorates nevertheless
have the power to supervise courts and judges, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China arts. 124–33; as does the Party through the CCDI. The Complaint Redress Department of the Supreme People’s Court also receives complaints about
judicial cases.
239 The Ombudsman only has jurisdiction over courts in relation to the registries and administrative offices of courts and tribunals for which the Judiciary Administrator has responsibility, Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), Sched. 1.
240 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China), Article 2 states that supervision extends to “persons in enterprises,
institutions or social organizations who are appointed by the administrative organs
of the State by means of delegation or dispatching or by other means.”
237
238
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from the
public
Can receive
complaints
from private
companies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Can receive
complaints
from
government
bodies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Can process
anonymous
complaints

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Duty of
secrecy or
confidentiality in relation
to complainant

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Complaints
filtered by
legislators

No

No

No

No

Can initiate
investigations
on own
motion

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Can obtain
evidence

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes241

Yes

Yes

Yes

No specific

Yes

Yes

No specific
provision

Can summon
witnesses
Penalty for

241 The MOS can question departments and individuals under supervision, but
can also call on the assistance of the “relevant administrative departments,” which
are required to render assistance. See Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 22.
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provision242

Power to
award
remedy

Indirect243

No

No

No

Power to impose penalty
on
investigated
bodies

Partly244

No

No

No

Power to
impose
penalty on
investigated
persons

Yes

No

No

No

Power to
make recommendation to
investigated
body

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Power to
compel investigated body
to implement
recommendation

Partly

No

No

Indirect

Power to
make reports
public

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

242 It is only stated that a unit or person “shall accept the supervisory proposal
made by the supervisory organ in accordance with the law.” See Implementation
Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 27.
243 See Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 23(3); see also
Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland
China) art. 22.
244 The MOS can circulate a notice of criticism against a department. See Law
on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 45.
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Decisions
subject to internal review
Decisions
subject to
external
review (on
merits)

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:2

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No245

No

No

No

245 Decisions of the MOS are not subject to external review, though decisions
of lower supervisory organs are subject to external review by hierarchically superior organs.
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